

*The Real  
Calvin Coolidge*

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An Annual Publication of  
The Calvin Coolidge Memorial Foundation, Inc.  
Plymouth, Vermont

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
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*President Coolidge and his father John Coolidge at Plymouth, VT*

Original post card photo was published by George E. Chalmers, Rutland, VT.

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## ABOUT THIS ISSUE

We are happy to present the eighth issue of *The Real Calvin Coolidge*, a series conceived and developed by Trustees John Lutz and John Waterhouse, to whom the Foundation as well as the Publications Committee remains deeply indebted.

It continues the idea of presenting fresh research with new book reviews and material from the interesting collection of first hand accounts by contemporaries edited with comments by Grace Coolidge, which appeared as a series in *Good Housekeeping* magazine in the issues from February to June, 1935.

These booklets are printed as an annual gift to active members of The Calvin Coolidge Memorial Foundation. They are also for general sale.

The Publications Committee

## *A Democrat Views Coolidge*

John Karol

If anyone had suggested, three years ago, that I would be addressing the 29th Annual Meeting of The Calvin Coolidge Memorial Foundation, I would have replied: "unlikely." To family and friends I might have been less charitable. At the time, my knowledge of Coolidge was limited to the popular clichés and anecdotes which you have heard all too often. I was perfectly willing to accept the polls of historians concluding that Calvin Coolidge was one of our least effective presidents.

But an opportunity to produce a biographical film on an American President doesn't often arise. Could a project of that significance transcend political preference? After all, the business of a filmmaker is filmmaking. If nothing else, a Coolidge documentary would require some interesting reading and an introduction to archival film research. I had a lot to learn—about Coolidge, about historians, and about newsreels and film archives.

I started off on an easy tack by reading Coolidge's *Autobiography*—two hundred and fifty pages, large print. It is generally dismissed by historians as "unrevealing". The moment I read it I knew I was on to something. It was as if Coolidge had written the script for expository sections of the film. For example, how could I improve on Coolidge's description of his father? Over black and white photographs of the old Vermonter, the narrator need only quote from the son's *Autobiography*:

My father, John Calvin Coolidge, ran the country store. He was successful. ... He trusted nearly everybody, but lost a surprisingly small amount... In addition to his business ability my father was very skillful with his hands... He had a complete set of tools, ample to do all kinds of building and carpenter work. He knew how to lay bricks and was an excellent stone mason... The lines he laid out were true and straight, and the curves regular. The work he did endured.

And over photographs of his mother and her winter grave, this from the son's *Autobiography*:

It seems impossible that any man could adequately describe his mother. I can not describe mine... There was a touch of

mysticism and poetry in her nature which made her love to gaze at the purple sunsets and watch the evening stars.

Whatever was grand and beautiful in form and color attracted her. It seemed as though the rich green tints of the foliage and the blossoms of the flowers came for her in the springtime, and in the autumn it was for her that the mountain sides were struck with crimson and with gold.

When she knew that her end was near she called us children to her bedside, where we knelt down to receive her final parting blessing.

In an hour she was gone. It was her thirty-ninth birthday. I was twelve years old. We laid her away in the blustering snows of March. The greatest grief that can come to a boy came to me. Life was never to seem the same again.

“Unrevealing” say the historians. This was the beginning of my two year immersion in the events and images of Calvin Coolidge’s life and times.

Among other things, it has been a political education. For example, the events surrounding the 1919 Boston Police Strike, during Coolidge’s first term as Massachusetts Governor, taught me to distinguish between a “do nothing” executive and an executive who knows when it’s best to do nothing.

Consider the context. The end of World War I brought economic turmoil and civil unrest to America. Two million American servicemen returned from Europe to a shortage of jobs and housing. Two million more were demobilized at home. War industries employing a quarter of the labor force were shutting down. These difficulties were compounded by what was called “the high cost of living”—an extraordinary inflation which doubled prices while earnings rose six percent. Wartime industry and government regulations were replaced by unemployment, inflation, race riots and strikes. During the first post-war year alone there were thirty-six hundred walk-outs involving four million workers.

In February 1919, three months after the Armistice, something new and alarming happened in America—the shutdown of an entire city by a general strike in Seattle. Thirty-five thousand ship workers were joined by the Seattle Labor Council in a sympathy strike totaling sixty thousand. Mayor Ole Hansen, a former Progressive, declared the strike

nothing less than the flame of Soviet revolution in America. He brought in the state militia. Although there was no violence and there were no arrests during the six day Seattle strike, Hansen was hailed as America’s answer to the Communist menace. He later resigned, wrote a book, and toured the country with his account of victory over Bolshevism.

The year 1919 saw the birth of both the American Communist Party (advocating the downfall of capitalism) and the American Legion (advocating one hundred percent Americanism). The lines were drawn. Public attention focused sharply on domestic radicals—and they gave Americans plenty to look at. Thirty-four postal bombs were discovered just before their scheduled May Day delivery to prominent citizens including J. P. Morgan, John D. Rockefeller, Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and President Wilson’s Attorney General, A. Mitchell Palmer. Palmer, with an eye to the 1920 Democratic nomination, maintained that the blaze of revolution was sweeping over America, “eating its way into the homes of the American workman, its sharp tongues of revolutionary heat...licking at the alters of the churches, leaping into the belfry of the school hall, crawling into the sacred corners of American homes, seeking to replace marriage vows with libertine laws, burning up the foundations of society.”

Governor Coolidge’s handling of the Boston Police Strike that September is often viewed at best simply as an exercise in firmness and resolve. Viewed in larger context, it is as much an example of executive restraint, consistent with Coolidge’s entire political philosophy.

Everyone, including Coolidge, recognized the merits of demands by Boston police for better pay and working conditions. But these were not the issues with which the Governor had to deal. The trouble arose over a proposal of the policemen, who had long been permitted to maintain a local organization, to form a union and affiliate with the American Federation of Labor. That was contrary to rules of the Department which had the effect of law. Coolidge thought it wrong to arbitrate authority of law or obedience to rules. In supporting Police Commissioner Edwin Curtis on this, Coolidge fully expected defeat in his coming campaign for reelection as Governor.

A different kind of politician might simply have invoked red scare rhetoric and violent over-reaction. Instead, Coolidge chose no such talk and minimal confrontation. Although he later felt that he should have called out the State Guard as soon as the police left their posts—as

requested by Mayor Andrew Peters—Coolidge accepted the Commissioner's view that it would not be needed. After the first night of looting and disorder, Mayor Peters called out the Guard units stationed in Boston, over which he had control. He then asked Coolidge to furnish more troops which the Governor did by calling substantially the entire State Guard to report at once.

With the State Guard in place and order restored, Commissioner Curtis held that the striking policemen had abandoned their sworn duty. Accordingly, he declared their places vacant. Samuel Gompers, president of the AFL, telegraphed Coolidge that the rights of the striking policemen had been denied. He asked for their reinstatement. Coolidge quickly replied with a lengthy but carefully worded telegram. In it he stated, "Your assertion that the Commissioner was wrong cannot justify the wrong of leaving the city unguarded... There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, any time." In remaining true to his principles, Coolidge thought he had committed political suicide. Massachusetts and the nation thought otherwise.

Others may disagree, but I can't imagine Coolidge rising to the political bait of issues like flag burning, the Pledge of Allegiance, or school prayer. In my opinion, he would have viewed these issues as having nothing to do with the business of government. He would have "bravely done nothing"—the advice President Reagan's former Solicitor General recently gave Congress on proposed flag burning legislation. As anyone reading Coolidge's speeches knows, he was a God-loving patriot. But nowhere in his countless public addresses do I find a hint of political opportunism. If I had to fashion a "sound bite" to characterize his politics, I would call Coolidge a political minimalist who wanted the least possible interference by government in the affairs of citizens. He chose to guide rather than legislate.

Typical was a speech President Coolidge gave on "Toleration and Liberalism" before the Annual Convention of the American Legion in Omaha on October 6, 1925. "Progress depends very largely on the encouragement of variety," said the President:

Whatever tends to standardize the community, to establish fixed and rigid modes of thought, tends to fossilize society. If we all believed the same thing and thought the same thoughts and applied the same valuations to all the occurrences about us, we should reach a state of equilibrium closely akin to an intel-

lectual and spiritual paralysis. It is the ferment of ideas, the clash of disagreeing judgments, the privilege of the individual to develop his own thoughts and shape his own character, that makes progress possible. It is not possible to learn much from those who uniformly agree with us. But many useful things are learned from those who disagree with us; and even when we can gain nothing our differences are likely to do us no harm.

The address was remarkable in view of the event which preceded it and the audience before whom it was given. Just two months earlier, while the President was vacationing in Swampscott, Massachusetts, the Ku Klux Klan had held its largest display of national power. More than 40,000 Klansmen paraded down Washington's Pennsylvania Avenue, rallying at the Washington Monument before 200,000 spectators. Coolidge's address before the American Legion was his first major appearance following that event. Although the President did not mention the Klan by name, it must have been on the mind of everyone present. Referring to the Legion's popular motto, Coolidge continued:

I recognize the full and complete necessity of 100 percent Americanism, but 100 percent Americanism may be made up of many elements.

Divine Providence has not bestowed upon any race a monopoly of patriotism and character.

The rhetoric of White House wordsmiths? Hardly. As one witness here today can attest, Coolidge wrote his own speeches. A master at delegating duties, he was not one to delegate beliefs.

I'm not the first to marvel at Coolidge's many speeches. They were the equal opposite of his inability to make small talk. Upon arrival in Washington as Harding's Vice President, Coolidge undertook his duties as the administration's official "diner-out." Coolidge took it in stride. "Got to eat somewhere," he explained. But Washington hostesses were stymied. As journalist Edward Lowry observed in the fall of 1921:

The elections of 1920 imported into the City of Conversation, as one of its necessary consequences, perhaps the oddest and most singular apparition this vocal and articulate settlement has ever known: a politician who does not, who will not, who seemingly cannot talk. A well of silence. A center of stillness.

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He has been described and observed as intently as was possible under the circumstances in the crush preceding the largest and gayest of dinner parties, standing quite still and saying not a blessed word, though all about him were babble and laughter and conversation. He didn't seem ill at ease or embarrassed or tongue-tied. He was just still... He gave no appearance of being about to say something presently. It was an absolute calm.

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He is a type entirely new to Washington.

In such social settings the myth of "Silent Cal" blossomed in countless tales, true and apocryphal. But even in that early year Lowry went on to observe: "What may be termed Mr. Coolidge's 'short game' with our common tongue is worthy of all the admiring comments that can be bestowed upon it. But his lightness and delicacy of touch in sinking his short putts when he has got the English language on the green approaches the marvelous."

By 1928, columnist Heywood Broun was convinced that Coolidge was "one hundred percent wooden." He went on to say that Coolidge was "the least gifted author the White House has known in many generations." Journalist Charles Willis Thompson disagreed, writing that Coolidge was, "in fact, one of the very few Presidents who can be thought of as literary men." For Thompson the difference between Coolidge and a stylist such as Woodrow Wilson was that Coolidge "used his style only as a tool and not as an ornament; he only used it when there would be some advantage in using it." Thompson went on:

The Attic style is not popular now and has no masters except Coolidge... His weapon is the short sentence, ...the distillation of a long process of thought. What another man might need a page to express can be set forth by Coolidge in a sentence of a dozen words and set forth completely, so that it does not need another syllable.

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As for the prevalent belief among the Intellectuals that Coolidge does not read, the evidences of his wide and thorough reading are abundant. He does not talk about it—he only uses it. What misleads the Intellectuals is that he does not quote, if he can possibly avoid it.

With that, let me simply press upon you the three principal volumes of Coolidge addresses: *Have Faith in Massachusetts*, a collection of early speeches; *The Price of Freedom*, a collection of Vice Presidential speeches; and *Foundations of the Republic* containing many of his Presidential addresses. The informal, spontaneous Coolidge awaits your discovery in the transcripts of his twice weekly press conferences, edited by Howard Quint and Robert Ferrell in their appropriately titled book, *The Talkative President*.

As to historians, the ones I could trust usually were the ones I had never heard of. After reading their books I knew nothing more about them than I had gleaned from the dust jacket. They were invisible in their text. Other more celebrated historians had annoying habits of appearing amid their pages. It was as if they set their historical cameras on tripods, then ran around in front and waved. Their political preferences were obvious and annoying—whether or not I shared their views.

Litmus tests seem to be in vogue these days. Here's one you can apply. Any historian or commentator who quotes Coolidge as saying "the business of America is business," probably has a hidden agenda. That misquote comes from an address President Coolidge gave before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in 1925. Speaking on "The Press Under a Free Government," Coolidge noted that American newspapers serve a double purpose. They bring knowledge and information to the electorate and, at the same time, play an important role in the business community through their news and advertising departments. Is there cause for alarm in this dual relationship?

After analysis of possible conflicts and compromises, Coolidge concluded that we probably are better served by a press which has a working acquaintance with commerce. "After all," he said, "the chief business of the American people is business. They are profoundly concerned with producing, buying, selling, investing, and prospering in the world."

But there was a more important point. The President went on to observe that "The chief ideal of the American people is idealism. I cannot repeat too often that America is a nation of idealists. That is the only motive to which they ever give any strong and lasting reaction... I could not truly criticize the vast importance of the counting room, but my ultimate faith I would place in the idealism of the editorial room of the American newspaper."

Historians who misquote the lesser point, usually are trying to prove Coolidge a Babbitt. In doing so we learn more about the historian than we do about Coolidge.

Once behind political facades, I found it fascinating to discover accomplishments of both the Harding and Coolidge Administrations that most Democrats would give their eye teeth to claim their own. For example, one aspect of Warren Harding's boring and immensely popular return to "normalcy" was his belief that "too much has been said about Bolshevism in America." Harding had never been swept off his feet by the post-war Red Scare. During the 1920 campaign he referred to wartime political prisoners on several occasions, indicating his willingness to review their cases.

High on the list was sixty-five year old Eugene Victor Debs, five times Socialist candidate for President of the United States. Debs was serving a ten-year sentence in Atlanta Federal Penitentiary. In 1918, while addressing the Ohio State Socialist Convention, Debs had advocated freedom of speech for those like himself who opposed our entry into the First World War. He was promptly indicted and convicted under the Wilson Administration's new Sedition Act. Recommendations for pardon were dismissed by President Wilson with a single word: "Denied." In private Wilson was heard to say: "This man was a traitor to his country and he will never be pardoned during my administration."

Two weeks before his inauguration, Harding told his Attorney General designate that he wished to free Debs and asked him to investigate the matter. Soon the new Attorney General advised President Harding that with some political risk Debs might be freed. A flurry of opposition to Debs' quick release arose from the American Legion and fearful Republican leaders. The *New York Times* in its editorial wisdom said curtly: "He is where he belongs. He should stay there." Over opposing voices of several cabinet members and Mrs. Harding, the President had a commutation of sentence drafted for Debs and twenty-three other political prisoners. The draft set Debs' release for December 31, 1921. Harding changed it to December 24, saying, "I want him to eat Christmas dinner with his wife."

Debs would have preferred to go directly home to Terre Haute, Indiana, but Harding asked him to stop by the White House. When the two met in the President's office, Harding bounded out of his chair and exclaimed: "Well, I have heard so damned much about you, Mr. Debs,

that I am now very glad to meet you personally." Scores of reporters awaited a statement from the gaunt Socialist leader when he emerged. Said Debs: "Mr. Harding appears to me to be a kind gentleman... We understand each other perfectly." Although the *New York Times* warned that "the majority of the American people will not approve of this commutation," the nation watched more in relief than anger as Debs and other political prisoners returned home. Buried in archives on deteriorating nitrate film, I have found newsreel footage of Debs' release in Atlanta, his visit to the White House, and his return to Terre Haute.

Upon Harding's death in August 1923, thirty-one other political prisoners were still in jail for violations of Wilson's Sedition Act. Although congressional advocates had not yet pressed the matter, President Coolidge started the machinery for their release. During a November press conference Coolidge reported:

An inquiry... about extending clemency to the remaining political prisoners. I don't exactly like the term political prisoners, because I hope we do not have any such thing in this country, but I use that term because you know what it means, I know what it means, and the public knows. I am having an investigation made, and when I get the results of the investigation I am going to act upon it. I think I may be able to get a report on it within a short time.

Less than two months later, all thirty-one prisoners were free.

More far-reaching was the outcome of the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference called by President Harding and his Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes in 1921. The resulting treaties halted the post-war arms race between Great Britain, Japan, and the United States. During the decade which followed, billions of taxpayers' dollars which would have been spent on armament went toward ends other than war. Granted, Harding and Coolidge did not establish eternal peace, but at least they maintained and fostered peace in their time. Coolidge's misadventures in Nicaragua began when he withdrew our Marine legation guard in 1925. The Marines had been stationed in Nicaragua since 1912, through the Taft, Wilson and Harding Administrations. Civil war broke out the moment they left. Reading of the ensuing events is to relive the present. The outstanding difference was Coolidge's dispatch of Henry Stimson to Nicaragua in a genuine effort to mediate the civil war.

It is on economic matters that Coolidge is most remembered. World War I and its aftermath saw the national debt rise from \$1.3 billion in March 1917 to \$26.6 billion in August 1919. Presidents Harding and Coolidge sought to reduce it. Both ran surpluses in all their annual budgets. By the time Coolidge left office, the national debt had been cut by one-third. I'm not sure that could ever be done again. But Harding and Coolidge did it.

Coolidge advocated "rigid economy in government" and dramatic reductions in taxes. Historians continually state that the tax cuts of the 1920's reversed the progressive policies of Woodrow Wilson. Far from it. Exemptions increased so much that by 1927 almost 98 percent of the population paid no income tax whatsoever. By the time Coolidge left office in March 1929, wealthy people earning over \$25,000 a year—a handsome salary then—paid 93 percent of the tax load. During Wilson's last year in office they had paid only 59 percent.

It is easy now to fault Coolidge for his unwillingness to seek control of expanding credit or regulation of the securities industry prior to the stock market crash of October 1929. But even if he had chosen to translate his private qualms into public action, it is doubtful that he would have been able to gather necessary support from Congress or the American people for enactment of regulations and reforms adequate to stem the speculative tide. And, in the unlikely event that Coolidge had secured congressional enactment of the necessary machinery, it is even less likely that the Supreme Court would have upheld its constitutionality in the legal context of the pre-depression period. Franklin Roosevelt had a hard enough time of it five years later in the midst of the depression.

The prosperity of the 1920's was genuine. It was shared by a large majority of Americans. The nation's economy employed virtually all its available resources. Nevertheless Coolidge cautioned the nation at the conclusion of his last State of the Union message, shortly before leaving office:

The country is in the midst of an era of prosperity more extensive and of peace more permanent than it has ever before experienced. But, having reached this position, we should not fail to comprehend that it can easily be lost...

The end of government is to keep open the opportunity for a more abundant life. Peace and prosperity are not finalities; they are only methods. It is easy under their influence for a

nation to become selfish and degenerate. This test has come to the United States. Our country has been provided with the resources with which it can enlarge its intellectual, moral, and spiritual life. The issue is in the hands of the people.

As a Democrat, how would I fault Coolidge? Somewhat sadly, for his unswerving idealism. Central to Coolidge's political philosophy since college was an underlying faith in the goodness of man and the belief that once abuses or inequities were revealed to an enlightened citizenship, its natural inclination to do right would bring correction through personal and local reform.

Nowhere can this be more easily seen than in Coolidge's 1922 address to the American Bar Association. The Vice President spoke on the limitations of the law in seeking "some short cut to perfection." Coolidge observed:

It is conceived that there can be a horizontal elevation of the standards of the nation, immediate and perceptible, by the simple device of new laws. This has never been the case in human experience. Progress is slow and the result of a long and arduous process of self-discipline... Real reform does not begin with a law, it ends with a law. The attempt to dragoon the body when the need is to convince the soul will end only in revolt.

Under the attempt to perform the impossible there sets in a general disintegration. When legislation fails, those who look upon it as a sovereign remedy simply cry out for more legislation. A sound and wise statesmanship which recognizes and attempts to abide by its limitations will undoubtedly find itself displaced by that type of public official who promises much, talks much, legislates much, expends much, but accomplishes little. The deliberate, sound judgment of the country is likely to find it has been superseded by a popular whim...

It is time to supplement the appeal to law, which is limited, with an appeal to the spirit of the people, which is unlimited.

In my heart, I believe it entirely. But in my head I know that if reform had not begun with a law, Blacks would still ride in the back of buses, people in wheelchairs would not go to libraries, and toxic waste would mount unchecked. These realities do not diminish my respect for the beauty and clarity of Coolidge's ideals. They simply affect the way I vote.



Throughout his political life Calvin Coolidge was essentially a moral force. As such the place we give him in history reflects as much on us as it does on him.

This address was presented by John Karol, of Orford, New Hampshire, at the Annual Meeting of The Calvin Coolidge Memorial Foundation in Plymouth, Vermont, August 6, 1989. Mr. Karol is the producer of the Foundation's forthcoming documentary film, *Coolidge: A Life in Our Time*.



*Sorting presidential correspondence at the Plymouth Notch. Over the post office, local people and a White House stenographer sort mail.*

Original post card photo was published by George E. Chalmers, Rutland, VT.

## *The Calvin Coolidge Papers at the Library of Congress*

by John E. Haynes

On May 6, 1929, J. Franklin Jameson, chief of the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, wrote to ex-President Calvin Coolidge. Jameson said he had "learned that there remains at the White House a considerable mass of papers of the period of your administration."<sup>1</sup> Jameson noted that the White House had "no claim" on the papers and "it is entirely for you to say what shall be done with them."<sup>2</sup> Jameson suggested that President Coolidge place these papers with the Library of Congress to join the papers of twenty-two other presidents already there. Coolidge's reply came swiftly. His two sentence letter of May 9, 1929 read "I shall be very glad if you would gather up all the papers which I left at the White House and store them at the Library of Congress. If you need any further information, you can get it of my former Secretary, Edward T. Clark at the Washington Building."<sup>3</sup>

It is typical for the solicitation and negotiation of the donation of historical papers to take a considerable volume of correspondence. Often exchanges between a depository institution and donor will stretch out over many years. Whether Jameson found Coolidge's swift and unadorned agreement disconcerting is not recorded. Jameson, however, felt a duty to discuss the matter even if Coolidge seem disinclined to do so. On May 10th, Jameson wrote Coolidge a lengthy letter describing the Library's proposed policies regarding his papers and stating that for the present the papers would be considered on loan and not a gift and that access would be restricted to those having Coolidge's permission. Coolidge replied with a one sentence letter, stating "The conditions of your letter of May 10th are correct."<sup>4</sup>

This exchange of four letters constitute the essential action that resulted in the Coolidge papers coming to the Library of Congress. There remained only the detail of picking up the papers from the White House. On July 11 a Library wagon picked up fifty steel transfer files. After President Coolidge's death, the Library confirmed the deposit with Mrs. Coolidge. The Library also suggested that Mrs. Coolidge consider uniting the papers President Coolidge had taken to Northampton with those at the Library

into a single collection. Mrs. Coolidge agreed on the desirability of this, but no action was ever taken to effect this outcome. It was not until 1953 that Mrs. Coolidge conveyed ownership of the papers to the United States. The papers remained closed to researchers during Mrs. Coolidge's lifetime unless she gave permission for access.<sup>5</sup>

President Coolidge's part of the transaction that brought his papers to the Library consisted of two letters containing three sentences. Coolidge's terseness, of course, is in accord with his reputation for succinct communication. There is also another aspect. Coolidge was hardly being casual about disposing of sensitive papers. Before Jameson approached him, Coolidge had taken care that little remained in his papers that need concern him. In a 1933 letter between Edward Clark, Coolidge's presidential secretary, and Harry E. Ross, Coolidge's last secretary, Clark stated: "Mr. Coolidge's desire was to destroy everything in the so-called personal files and there would have been nothing preserved if I had not taken some things out on my own responsibility." Clark added, "I caught hell for saving anything."<sup>6</sup> In 1959, St. George Sioussat, who had been chief of the Manuscript Division in the 1930s, reported that in 1938 Mrs. Coolidge had told him that President Coolidge had destroyed most of his papers.<sup>7</sup> Of what was not destroyed, a portion went with Coolidge to Northampton and a larger part went to the Library of Congress.

Most of the Coolidge papers received by the Library are what are commonly called "case files" in political offices. Citizens write to an elected official asking help on a specific matter, complaining about a government action, or urging the adoption of particular policy. Each complaint or issue constitutes a "case." Such letters are answered with a polite acknowledgment, referred to the appropriate executive agency for action, or some other response. The nature and extent of the response varies with the political salience of the issue, the sensitivity and efficiency of the receiving office, the importance of the writer, and so forth. Such correspondence and such "cases" are the everyday business of almost every city councilman, state legislator, and congressman in America. It is also the everyday business of the White House. Today hundreds of thousands of such letters are addressed to the President and answered by the White House staff. It was no different in Coolidge's day except that the volume was considerably less.

The historical value of the Coolidge case files is generally in the incoming letters that may say something of interest about citizens attitudes

and the occasional letter from a significant public figure about some matter of governmental importance. One of the more interesting case files is #111, labeled "Political Prisoners." This file deals with thirty-one federal prisoners who had been convicted of various wartime statutes dealing with interference with the war-effort in 1917 and 1918. By 1923 most persons convicted for such crimes had served their sentences or been released early by various amnesties. President Harding, in particular, had released early most prisoners held for wartime violations. Those who remained were called "political prisoners" by those who wanted them released. Most were members of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), an anarcho-syndicalist labor union that had advocated resistance to military conscription, industrial sabotage, and the overthrow of the government. (Let me note that Coolidge did not accept the designation of "political prisoners" for these prisoners. In a letter to Attorney General James Daugherty he referred to "the improperly applied term of political prisoners."<sup>8</sup>)

The "political prisoners" file is an interesting one. It contains letters from numerous clergymen and civil liberties groups urging full pardons on free speech grounds for those imprisoned, arguing that the prisoners were convicted for their beliefs and speech rather than for overt acts. The file contains as well a letter from Senator William Borah urging that the prisoners be pardoned on the grounds that their trials had been legally flawed. Reinforcing Borah's position is a statement from Judge Frank Rudkin who had presided at some of the IWW trials. Rudkin felt that decisions later reached by U.S. appeals courts rendered convictions of the IWW prisoners on several counts inappropriate and that on those counts where conviction could still be sustained, the prisoners had served sufficient time. Senator George W. Pepper of Pennsylvania also offered the view that the convictions were flawed due to confusion between overt acts that interfered with the war effort and speech that protested the war. Present also are letters from those hostile to releasing the IWW militants. The residing judge in Los Angeles' Superior Court wrote to advise Coolidge that releasing the IWW prisoners would make enforcement of the prohibition law difficult as the crimes of the IWW prisoners made violations of the Volstead Act seem trivial. Letters and messages from the American Legion, the Sons of the American Revolution, and various individuals also opposed amnesty. Reports on the medical condition of several ill IWW prisoners are also found.<sup>9</sup>

In the end, Coolidge appointed a committee of three to advise him on the prisoners. The committee consisted of Newton D. Baker (President

Wilson's Secretary of War), Episcopal Bishop Charles H. Brent (former Chief of Chaplains for the American Expeditionary Force), and General James G. Harbord (former Chief of Staff of the AEF). The committee recommended that the prisoners be released; Coolidge then commuted the sentences of all thirty-one to the time already served and released them.<sup>10</sup>

The "political prisoners" file #111 is one of the more historically interesting case files in the Coolidge Papers. Perhaps more representative of the case files in the papers are the neighbors of file #111. Case file #110 contains routine correspondence regarding the Presidential yacht the "Mayflower." Case file #112 is a routine file on an application for executive clemency for a prisoner convicted of an ordinary federal crime; no matter of first amendment rights in wartime or other issues of historical moment here. Case file #113 contains correspondence with Richard Washburn Child regarding his resignation as ambassador to Italy. It contains one letter in which Child makes a few substantive remarks about European diplomacy. The rest of the file contains only letters regarding appointments, social calls, and other polite exchanges between Coolidge and Ambassador Child. Case file #114 is a thick one. It is labeled "Inland Waterways" and contains the "meat-and-potatoes" of everyday American politics. File #114 contains numerous letters, petitions, memoranda, studies, and other communications from various city, state, and congressional office holders and a multitude of private individual and business firms urging federal funding for various river and harbor projects. Typical, for example, is the letter of Burtis S. Perry of Highlands, New Jersey, regarding the advantages to local business that would ensue if the U.S. government dredged the Shrewsbury River so as to allow a heavier volume of river transport.<sup>11</sup>

These case files are important documentation on the everyday course of the Coolidge presidency, and the Library of Congress is grateful that the files were saved and privileged to hold them. On the other hand, neither are the Coolidge case files the historical equivalent of the mother lode. We do not get President Coolidge's inner most thoughts, expositions of his philosophy of government or life, or even detailed explanations or justifications for a variety of highly important policy decisions he made. As Edward Clark wrote in 1933 of these papers, "I am afraid you will not find much that would be helpful to a biographer."<sup>12</sup> For example, case file #111 on the IWW prisoners tells one what various people thought about the matter and tells one what Coolidge did. There is nothing in the file,

however, that tells one *why* Coolidge decided to commute the sentences. Did he think the prisoners improperly convicted as did Senator Borah and various civil liberties groups? Did he regard it as an act of charity for misguided and essentially harmless men who had been punished enough as did Bishop Brent? Did he think it time to put the inflamed emotions and controversies of the war behind as did Newton Baker? A copy in file #111 of the White House announcement of Coolidge's commutation order only announces the decision and is devoid of any explanation. One can make a guess or even come to judgment based on one's estimate of Calvin Coolidge. What one cannot do is point to any direct evidence, any sheet of paper in file #111, on which Coolidge expresses his view.

Are we, then, to think that President Coolidge, in the interest of protecting the privacy of his thoughts, destroyed those papers of revealing his thoughts and leaving history the loser? Perhaps not. It is not at all clear that even the material Coolidge destroyed would have told us much about Coolidge's views. Let me quote at length another letter Clark wrote to Harry Ross.

The simple filing system in use at the White House in our time classified the mail under two heads, official and personal. The first consists of letters written by Government officials to the President. The second includes the immense mass of ordinary correspondence which is not official in character. Mr. Coolidge's first impulse was to destroy the latter without even having it looked over. This would not involve the loss which you might at first imagine because as President, Mr. Coolidge did not follow the practice of other Presidents in trying to explain his Administration through letters to friends.

Mr. Hoover, for instance, has tried to dictate a memorandum after every important conference giving his recollection of the event [Clark also served for a time as a close aide to President Herbert Hoover] and I have no doubt that he also followed Wilson's practice in embodying the same historical information in letters. Mr. Coolidge, however, strictly avoided this and the file, therefore, consisted of the huge number of letters to him which might be of interest but with replies which reveal little or nothing....<sup>13</sup>

We may, then, regret that the destruction of a large part of Coolidge's files has denied us access to incoming mail that may have been of historical value. However, we can at least take some cold comfort that the loss of

Coolidge's outgoing mail leaves us not much worse than we otherwise would be in regard to this very private man.

All of this leaves the Coolidge historian with a considerable challenge. Still, we know a person both by what that person says and by what others say of him. In regard the first, Coolidge is not the most cooperative of subjects. In regard the second, we are more fortunate. Not everyone Coolidge dealt with or who served in influential roles in his administration shared his reticent habits. To turn to the resources of the Library of Congress in this area, we possess, as already mentioned, Edward Clark's personal papers. Clark's papers include a considerable correspondence with President Coolidge after he left the White House as well as correspondence with other prominent Republicans. You also find strewn throughout Clark's papers occasional letters of political importance or sensitivity that Clark saved. Naturally, these are letters to Coolidge rather than Coolidge's own writing. Even so, they are of some importance, although limited in quantity. Clark's own letters to Coolidge, particularly in the years after the presidency also are often full of comment and detail about government and politics. The Library's Everett Sanders Papers contain reading copies of many Coolidge speeches. The Library also has the papers of Charles Evans Hughes (Coolidge's Secretary of State), James J. Davis (Coolidge's Secretary of Labor), Henry S. New (Coolidge's Postmaster General), William M. Jardine (Coolidge's Secretary of Agriculture), Henry T. Rainey (Democratic House leader during the Coolidge era), Charles L. McNary (powerful Republican Senator from Oregon in the period), James W. Wadsworth (Republican U.S. Senator from New York), Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. (a prominent figure in Republican politics in the early 1920s), Wallace H. White (an influential Maine Republican congressman), William S. Culbertson (vice chairman of the Tariff Commission), George Sutherland (active in the 1920 campaign), William E. Humphrey (member of the Federal Trade Commission during Coolidge's presidency), and Walter L. Fisher (a prominent Chicago Republican). All show different aspects of Coolidge and his presidency. Important manuscript collections can also be found at other institutions and the National Archives maintains many official records from federal agencies. With effort, many of the gaps left by Coolidge's destruction of a portion of his papers and by his habitual terseness can be filled in.

With some notable exceptions, the general opinion among academic historians regarding Coolidge has been negative, often hostile or con-

temptuous. I remember well as a graduate student in history reading and chuckling at the savage ridicule depicting Coolidge as a simple minded fool in Irving Bernstein's influential book *The Lean Years*.<sup>14</sup> Bernstein was hardly alone. Many are the historians who have sketched Coolidge as a blind follower of an intellectually bankrupt ideology of *laissez-faire* who led or allowed the nations to drift into a false prosperity, a sort of decadent and greedy debauch that inevitably resulted in the catastrophe of the Great Depression. President Hoover, of course, has received much of the historical blame for the Depression. Hoover, however, also has received the benefit of a modest revisionism by some historians. These revisionists credit Hoover with attempting, although too little too late, to intervene in the economy through creation of the Agricultural Marketing Board, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the launching of massive public works. These actions and Hoover's corporatist philosophy of business-government cooperation and planning were seen as precursors of the New Deal and the modern liberal prescription of an activist government managing and regulating the economy.

Coolidge, however, has not benefited from much revisionism. Indeed, many of the Hoover revisionists tend to push the blame for the Great Depression backward, off of Hoover and on to Coolidge. In my own view the time is overdue for a different appreciation not only of Coolidge but of the 1920s as an era. What must be appreciated is the tremendous economic growth that took place in the 1920s. By 1929 most American industrial workers had electricity, indoor toilets, central heating, and an income considerably above subsistence level, a marked change from the condition of most workers prior to World War I. A study of comparative wages between workers of different countries in 1928 by the International Labor Organization scaled wages for workers in London at 100, in Berlin at 66, in Brussels at 55, in Vienna at 48, and in New York at 179, making American workers easily the best paid in the world. The number of automobiles in the U.S. stood at little more than one a quarter million in 1914. In 1929 the number of American roads passed twenty-six million and auto production exceeded five million a year. With one auto for every five Americans, the automobile had become a consumer staple for the average American family. Radio was an expensive luxury at the beginning of the 1920s and expenditures on radios were less than eleven millions dollars. By the end of the decade expenditures on radios exceeded four hundred million dollars. Radio had become an inexpensive mass media and was found in most American homes. National income increased from \$59.4

billion in 1921 to \$87.2 billion in 1929, and real per capita income rose from \$522 to \$716.<sup>15</sup> The British historical commentator Paul Johnson has written:

[T]he view that the 1920s was a drunken spree destructive of civilized values can be substantiated only by the systematic distortion or denial of the historical record. The prosperity was very widespread and very solid. It was not universal; in the farming community particularly it was patchy, and it largely excluded certain older industrial communities, such as the textile trade of New England. But it was more widely distributed than had been possible in any community of this size before, and it involved the acquisition, by tens of millions, of the elements of economic security which had hitherto been denied them throughout the whole of history.<sup>16</sup>

In addition to a favorable view of Coolidge, Johnson takes a negative view of Hoover. He advances the argument that Hoover's well-intentioned governmental intervention into the economy in 1930, 1931, and 1932 transformed what likely would have been a sharp but normal and short-lived recession on the order of the recession of 1920-1922 into the catastrophe of the Great Depression. Johnson, although a highly skilled historical writer, is not an academic scholar and is British as well. His views find few echoes among professional American historians.

I do not think the remarkable record of economic success of the 1920s was achieved despite President Coolidge or that his presidency and the prosperity of the 1920s was coincidental. Wrong headed government policies could have slowed the economic boom of the 1920s or stopped it in its tracks. Coolidge, however, recognized the limitations of government, used federal power sparingly and with reluctance, and championed the need for individual endeavor in order to produce sustained economic growth. Coolidge's morality of individual responsibility has seemed obsolete to many historians. Coolidge, however, recognized that political morality must be judged by effects and not be intentions. In this century we have seen tens of millions of humans shot, starved, impoverished, and imprisoned in the name of mass ideologies that justify their disastrous work in the name of humanitarian intentions. Perhaps as the ideological illusions of this century fade, historians will better appreciate the public morality of individual responsibility championed by Coolidge.

John E. Haynes is 20th century political history specialist in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. The views expressed in this essay are his own and do not represent those of the Library of Congress.

Mr. Haynes had originally prepared this essay for presentation at a meeting of Coolidge friends in the Washington D.C. area that had to be cancelled. He kindly submitted his prepared text for inclusion in this issue of *The Real Calvin Coolidge*.

#### Footnotes:

1. J. Franklin Jameson to Calvin Coolidge, May 6, 1929, Library of Congress Manuscript Division Coolidge Papers administrative case file. Jameson learned of the papers from Rudolph Forster, an assistant secretary at the White House.

2. Control and ownership of presidential papers by tradition rested with the President. It was not until Presidential Records Act (PL95-591) of the late 1970s that presidential papers were made the property of the United States Government.

3. Coolidge to Jameson, May 9, 1929, Library of Congress Manuscript Division Coolidge Papers administrative case file.

4. Jameson to Coolidge, May 10, 1929, Coolidge to Jameson, May 13, 1929, Library of Congress Manuscript Division Coolidge Papers administrative files.

5. Jameson to Harry E. Ross (secretary to Mrs. Coolidge), February 4, 1933, Ross to Jameson, February 13, 1933, Coolidge Papers; Instrument of Gift, April 2, 1953, Library of Congress Manuscript Division Coolidge Papers administrative files.

6. Clark to Ross, March 31, 1933, Edward T. Clark papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

7. Fred Shelly memorandum regarding St. George Sioussant conversation, March 3, 1959, Library of Congress Manuscript Division Coolidge Papers administrative case file.

8. Coolidge to Daugherty, August 3, 1923, case file #111, Box 111, Calvin Coolidge Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, hereafter referred to as Coolidge Papers.

9. John Taylor to Coolidge, August 25, 1923, Edward Clark to Pierson Banning, August 27, 1923, Borah to Coolidge, September 29, 1923, "Notes for the Files of the Joint Amnesty Committee in Washington of Mrs. Baker's Interview with Judge Frank H. Rudkin" July 13-20, 1923, George W. Pepper to C. Bascom Slemph (secretary to President Coolidge), September 25, 1923, case file #111, Box 111, Coolidge Papers.

10. Coolidge to Baker, Brent and Harbord, October 29, 1923, "It was announced today ..." attached to Daugherty to Coolidge, December 15, 1923, case file #111, Box 111, Coolidge Papers.

11. Burtis S. Perry to C. B. Shueff (secretary to President Coolidge), July 22, 1926, case file #114, Box 111, Coolidge Papers.

12. Clark to Ross, March 31, 1933.

13. Clark to Ross, January 28, 1933, Clark Papers.

14. Irving Bernstein, *The Lean Years: A History of the American Worker, 1920-1933*, Baltimore, 1966, pp. 254, 261.

15. On economic growth in the 1920s, see George Soule, *Prosperity Decade from War to Depression, 1917-1929* (New York: 1947), Harold Underwood Faulkner, *American Economic History* (New York: 1976), W. W. Rostow, *The World Economy* (Austin, Texas: 1978), and Ronald Edsforth, *Class Conflict and Cultural Consensus: The Making of a Mass Consumer Society in Flint, Michigan* (New Brunswick: 1987)

16. Paul Johnson, *Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Eighties* New York, 1983, pp. 223.

## Book Reviews

Gloria May Stoddard, *Grace and Cal, A Vermont Love Story* (Shelburne, VT: The New England Press, 1989) 159 pp, \$12.95

Gloria Stoddard's new book, *Grace and Cal, A Vermont Love Story*, fills a gap for young and old as a new popular history of Calvin and Grace Coolidge and the times in which they lived. Similar in style to Stoddard's two other books: *Snowflake Bentley* and *Henry Leland*, (fellow Vermonters, one who stayed and one who went West) *Grace and Cal* has woven into it almost every known Coolidge story or anecdote.

Written in a free and readable style, it covers their lives in a relatively superficial way without the use of detailed footnotes and bibliographical references. It is well illustrated with many of the pictures reproduced for the first time.

Unfortunately there are several errors of fact which can easily be corrected but also some of the content, most notably page 35, which condenses Coolidge's role in the Boston Police Strike with a timetable that is notably different from what actually occurred.

This book is a welcome addition to popular Coolidge literature for all ages and should be well received.

Review by Clifford A. Pease, Jr., M.D.



*Grace and Calvin Coolidge the day before he became President of the United States, August 2, 1923. Both are at the watering trough near the Wilder House, Plymouth, Vermont.*

Photo by Herb Davison, summer newspaper reporter, now living in Middletown Springs, Vermont.

A Modern View of the Coolidge Image  
*Popular Images of American Presidents*  
 Edited by William C. Spragens  
 625 pp., hardbound, Greenwood Press, New York, 1988

This book is a compilation of essays by different authors analyzing the popular images of Presidents both in their time and since. There is an introductory essay on the topic, and a comparative one at the end. More emphasis is given to the Presidents from this century, particularly to their image in modern forms of media.

Of special interest to students of Calvin Coolidge is Chapter 12 (pp. 297-322), which is the essay on the 30th President by Malcolm Lee Cross, PhD. Cross is Assistant Professor of Social Sciences at Tarleton State University in Texas.

Cross has done his homework, as can be seen by the sources cited in his footnotes. He makes use of all three major biographies of Coolidge (White, Fuess, and McCoy), and E. C. Lathem's three Coolidge books. Cross also did a good survey of popular and academic periodical literature related to Coolidge from 1919 to the early 1980s. In a rare event among academics writing about the 30th President, Cross even visited Plymouth Notch, Vermont in August, 1982. He found it "no shoddy, gaudy tourist trap. The buildings are clean and well kept. The few souvenirs for sale—mainly postcards and books about Coolidge—are invariably in good taste. The attendants take real pride in their work and show genuine friendliness and courtesy to all visitors who come."

Cross uses many famous anecdotes to flesh out his introductory sketch of Coolidge's image. Noting the poor reputation Coolidge has in academic circles, while stories about him still appear in print, Cross comments: "If Coolidge is not the hero of American scholars, he is at least the hero of American newspaper fillers."

In summing up the origins of Coolidge's image, Cross sees him as "not just another politician... His perceived role in the Boston police strike and his notable emotional reserve made him appear to be a strong, thoughtful leader. More important, his Vermont boyhood and his middle-class lifestyle made him seem to be... an idealized average American, the embodiment of traditional American values and a reminder of a simpler America..." Cross accepts the "liberal" version that Coolidge did nothing decisive in his handling of the Boston police strike. He feels that in spite of this, Coolidge gained national fame from the media attention given to his taking the last actions at the end of the strike. These were: calling out the state guard, reinstating Police Commissioner Curtis, and sending

Samuel Gompers the telegram with the most dramatic public statement of the year ("There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, anytime.")

Besides the popular image itself, Cross feels that the most important factor of Coolidge's political success was the President's canniness in manipulating the media of the day to maintain this image in the eyes of the public. Coolidge's near-monthly speeches on radio, and his courting of the news media by instituting (and maintaining) twice-weekly press conferences are seen by Cross as conscious tactics: "His opponents likened him to great fog; Coolidge seemed to be everywhere...[on]...the political landscape. Yet, also like a fog, Coolidge seemed insubstantial, intangible. His refusal to discuss concrete issues in specific terms deprived his opponents of openings for attacks. He reduced them to political shadow boxers, unable to challenge the image he projected."

Cross does not feel that Coolidge really lived up to his image as a "strong leader and an average American." He points to Coolidge's declining "to take an active role in government" and lack of success with Congress during his Presidency to support this assertion. As far as being an "average American," Cross states that "Coolidge had qualities that were not typical: keen ambition, shrewd judgement, a devout love of politics, a phenomenal genius for self-advertisement, and a remarkable ability to establish a rapport with the public while remaining totally true to himself."

At the end of the essay, Cross concludes that Coolidge, although possibly partly responsible for the depression, escaped public opprobrium because he was believed to have been a great leader during prosperous times. Cross even compares Coolidge's popularity during his term to that of F. D. Roosevelt.

All in all, this is an even-handed view of Coolidge's public image. It is neither a snide critique, nor blind admiration of the man. One minor irritant in this essay is that a few errors of fact crept in, such as John C. Coolidge's death date, an assertion the latter started life with "no resources," a ridiculously low number of the Boston Police walking out on strike in 1919, and the 1919 Boston Mayor's first name. In spite of these minor flaws, Malcolm Cross has contributed a useful essay to the growing body of new appraisals of Calvin Coolidge as President.

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Review by J. R. Greene

*The Real Calvin Coolidge**Reprinted from Good Housekeeping, May, 1935*

Mrs. Coolidge's Introduction:

On one of the shelves of the library in our Northampton home is a row of books bound in blue Morocco leather with a gold star in each corner of the front cover, designating that the President is Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Navy. Each of these little books contains the typewritten manuscript from which he read when delivering an address. It was to this row of books that Mr. Coolidge pointed when he said to Mr. Cartotto, the artist who made portraits of him:

"Those are my works of art. Every word had to be considered for fear of misuse."

Up to the time that he became President, Mr. Coolidge wrote his speeches on sheets of foolscap paper in pencil, going over them again and again, changing a word here, a word there, transposing and rewriting with infinite pains. When he had finished a speech, it was given to his secretary to be typewritten. None was every wholly satisfactory to him at the time. Afterward he would read one and say,

"That was a pretty good speech, after all."

When he became President, he began dictating his speeches to his stenographer, a quiet young man of inexhaustible patience, devoted to his chief.

Sometimes the young man would come to the President's study and spend a whole evening, his pencil poised above his pad, without making a single character. At last the President would say:

"That is all. You may come back at eight o'clock in the morning."

At other times composition flowed readily, and the stenographer would leave with his book well filled.

Among all the addresses which Mr. Coolidge made during his public life I know of only one which I suspect he did not write himself. It was delivered in Boston at a dinner given in connection with the celebration of the centennial anniversary of a well-known piano company.

Mr. Coolidge was Governor of Massachusetts at the time.

Seated with Mr. and Mrs. Stearns in the balcony, I listened with growing amazement. The address dealt with composers and musical compositions in a way which indicated wide knowledge and discrimination in a field that lay wholly outside his study and experience.

When he joined us at the conclusion of the ceremony, I burst into laughter in which he quietly joined, a little shamefacedly, as I asked him

where he obtained all that information. He did not commit himself.

Later, when Mr. Stearns, who comments later on Mr. Coolidge's methods of composition, was arranging his address for publication in the volume entitled "Have Faith in Massachusetts," Mr. Coolidge declined to permit the inclusion of the piano centenary address.

Possibly no man has taken over the duties of the Presidency who was better qualified by training and experience to discharge them than Mr. Hoover, whom it is now my pleasure to introduce. He had been a member of the Cabinet for eight years; closely in touch with the policies pursued by the two previous administrations; he had spent many years abroad, where he had gained a knowledge of European affairs; he had made a visit to South America and gained firsthand information in those countries. As I sat listening to his inaugural address, I thought how fortunate it was for us all that our new President had such a broad outlook upon world interests.

*The Three Purgatories*

By HERBERT HOOVER

*Former President of the United States*

One of Mr. Coolidge's high public characteristics was taciturnity. That did not apply to his friends. His was a penetrating, analyzing mind which enjoyed stripping the tinsel from ideas; an acute wit and a large sense of humor over the passing event; a crisp capacity in narration of anecdote.

Perhaps his reputation for taciturnity came from his declared formula for handling certain types of callers. He held that most of them came solely in their own interest—not public interest—and that their consumption of time could be lessened if their exposition was not stimulated by either question or comment.

Mr. Coolidge was a man of complete intellectual honesty; and to him the worst epithet he could use about public men who privately professed one thing and who publicly advocated another, and who promised things they knew no man could bring about, was simply "demagogue." And he could amplify his diagnosis of such individuals with effectiveness. He was a man kindly and deep in his attachments; but he classed a quality in public men who engaged in backslapping and who at once addressed new acquaintances by their first names as a species of "infantile demagoguery."

Mr. Coolidge was without patience in face of corruption in public life. Here he became emphatic if not expansive. Upon a certain current scandalous transaction he remarked:

"Some people think they can escape purgatory. There are three purgatories to which people can be consigned: to be damned by one's fellows;




to be damned by the courts; to be damned in the next world. I want these men to get all three—without probation.”

*Mrs. Coolidge comments:*

After the inaugural ceremonies at the Capitol, with the exception of a brief meeting with the President and Mrs. Hoover at the Convention of the American Legion in Boston in October, 1930, I was not to see them again until they came to Northampton to pay their final tribute to the man with whom Mr. Hoover had been closely associated for eight years, whom he had succeeded in the Presidency. Once more I saw in a President's face the lines which are evidence of the heavy toll imposed by multifarious burdens. It was all so familiar to me! Fortunately Mr. Hoover was physically stronger and had better recuperative powers than Mr. Coolidge had.

I have not seen Mr. Hoover since his retirement, but those who see him frequently tell me that he as reacted marvelously to rest and freedom from the cares of office. May he live long to give us the benefit of his experience and counsel!



*The Hoovers and Coolidges (including son, John) at the  
Brule River, Wisconsin, June 1928.  
The Coolidge family went fishing at the Cedar Island Lodge.*

Herbert Hoover Presidential Library-Museum photo.